Setbacks and breakdowns characterise Thailand’s official peace dialogue process, which Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government started in 2013. The aim was to seek a resolution to the insurgency in the country’s southernmost provinces, which had flared up some twelve years earlier.¹ The inaugural process included Thailand, represented by the National Security Council, and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the main militant group, with Malaysia serving as facilitator.² It ended after three plenary meetings, undone by poor preparation and growing political turmoil in Bangkok, as well as BRN’s objection to being pressured into talks by Malaysia.³ After the 2014 coup d’état in...

The peace dialogue process restarted in 2015 with Majlis Syura Patani (Patani Consultative Council, or MARA Patani) formed, with Malaysia’s encouragement, as an umbrella organisation of Malay-Muslim national liberation fronts to negotiate with Thailand.5 As BRN did not join, MARA Patani has had to contend with allegations that its representatives belong to defunct fronts that, with the possible exception of Patani United Liberation Organisation, command no fighters in Thailand. A BRN member described MARA Patani as “all leaders, no followers”.⁶ In a bid for inclusivity, MARA Patani reserved its senior posts for BRN members, but BRN insisted that it was...

Though the MARA Patani process may not be dead, it has been paralysed since April 2018. In order to hold more substantive talks, the parties will have to overcome in-ternal dissension and ambivalence about dialogue, as well as gain confidence in the process structure and design.

Disunity within leadership of both the Thai and separatist parties has afflicted efforts to build confidence and maintain continuity in the dialogue process.

Among Thailand’s leaders and security officials, divisions are evident between supporters of dialogue and those who prioritise a military victory over the insur-gents.²⁴ Although dialogue is codified in national security plans...

The long-running insurgency has been in a period of stagnation for the past several years. Violent incidents and casualties have decreased steadily since 2007, when 892 people were killed. In 2018, the death toll fell to 218, the lowest since 2004. But low-er levels of violence do not necessarily correspond to a greater sense of safety among people in the region, who often feel threatened by the heavy presence of security forces. A survey whose results were reported in February 2019 found that nearly half of respondents felt the situation was unchanged.⁶² An activist summed up local sentiment: “The local...

It is not evident that Thailand and Malay-Muslim separatists have reached a point where they believe that compromise serves their interests better than continued hostilities. Each side appears to value preserving their claims to sovereignty above ending the violence. But each side also sees some utility in dialogue, even if it has more to do with managing the conflict than resolving it. The moment at least offers an opportunity for dialogue to become entrenched, and talking in itself may serve to uncover common ground. Getting there will require changes to the existing process, including bringing BRN to the table, taking...

For many years, peace dialogue was a taboo for Thai authorities. Only in 2013 did the Thai state officially recognise a challenge from Malay-Muslim insurgents and undertake to seek a resolution through negotiations. For its part, BRN operated in complete secrecy, content to let violence speak for the movement. Though the advent of dialogue changed the conflict’s dynamics, it is so far characterised by missteps and long pauses. Internal discord on both sides, mixed motives for participating in talks and a structure that does not enjoy the belligerents’ confidence have stood in the way of productive talks. But even the...