Front Matter Front Matter (pp. [i]-[i])https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.1OPEN ACCESSTable of Contents Table of Contents (pp. [ii]-[ii])https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.2OPEN ACCESSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS (pp. Page i-Page iii)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.3OPEN ACCESSINTRODUCTION I. INTRODUCTION (pp. Page 1-Page 2)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.4OPEN ACCESSThree decades after the 1973-1977 insurrection in Balochistan, a low-level insurgency again challenges central control over the province. After almost seven years of military rule, deprived of representative participatory institutions and with their natural resources exploited by Islamabad, Baloch alienation is at an all-time high. Although regional parties and leaders are still struggling to obtain political, economic and social rights within a democratic, federal, parliamentary framework, militants have picked up the gun.
Baloch political parties and militants have a common goal — to assert provincial control over Balochistan’s natural resources and gain a voice in shaping its political, economic and...
CENTRALISED RULE AND BALOCH RESISTANCE II. CENTRALISED RULE AND BALOCH RESISTANCE (pp. Page 2-Page 7)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.5OPEN ACCESSBalochistan is the largest of Pakistan’s four provinces. Some 347,190 square kilometres in size, it covers 43 per cent of its land area but has only around 6 per cent of its population.⁸ The ethnic make-up, according to last official estimates, is 54.7 per cent Baloch, 29.0 per cent Pashtun.⁹
It is the least developed province but rich in energy and mineral resources,10 meeting more than 40 per cent of Pakistan’s energy needs through its gas and coal reserves and accounting for 36 per cent of its total gas production. Large energy reserves remain untapped.11 However, 46.6 per cent of...
BACK TO THE BEGINNING III. BACK TO THE BEGINNING (pp. Page 7-Page 13)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.6OPEN ACCESSOn 12 October 1999, General Musharraf dismissed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, justifying his coup on the grounds of democratic reform, including the removal of provincial grievances through the devolution of power.48 Instead, the Punjabi-dominated military government, bent on regime survival and consolidation, moved quickly to concentrate all power in its hands.49 Musharraf’s constitutional manipulations made the president, the symbolic head of the federation, all powerful, reducing the national parliament to a rubber stamp and depriving the Baloch of the voice they had gained in the democratic forums of the 1990s. With Musharraf wearing the dual hats of president and army...
BALOCH GRIEVANCES AND DEMANDS IV. BALOCH GRIEVANCES AND DEMANDS (pp. Page 13-Page 19)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.7OPEN ACCESSIf Islamabad’s exploitation of Balochistan’s resources and neglect of the province’s development are responsible for Baloch alienation, the military government’s refusal to negotiate the demands for provincial autonomy is primarily responsible for the conflict. Since Pakistan is a “multicultural, multi-regional state”, said an opposition politician, “it should be run as a federation. The powers of the federation should be decided by the federating units”, and the federal government “should be subservient to parliament”.100 But, as mentioned, Musharraf’s devolution scheme has consolidated the centre’s control over local levels of government, and his constitutional manipulations have made the national parliament subservient to...
ISLAMABAD’S RESPONSE V. ISLAMABAD’S RESPONSE (pp. Page 19-Page 25)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.8OPEN ACCESSFollowing the outbreak of conflict, the military government responded at first with negotiations to address Baloch grievances and demands. However, the Baloch opposition was unsure of Islamabad’s intentions from the start, suspicious that the negotiations were in bad faith, more to placate unrest than to resolve differences. With their failure, the cynics were proved right.
“There will be a stage when the political process and dialogue will no longer work. The Baloch and Pashtuns (of Balochistan) will not sit back and be marginalised; they will want to fight back. We want to be engaged in the political and parliamentary process...
GEOPOLITICS VI. GEOPOLITICS (pp. Page 25-Page 26)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.9OPEN ACCESSIslamabad insists that the Baloch ‘miscreants’ have foreign backing, political and material. Some government officials have implied that U.S. and British intelligence agencies support the militants — to undermine the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline and to prevent Gwadar from becoming a functional port at which China’s presence might threaten U.S. oil and naval interests in the Gulf region.212 But the brunt of the blame is placed on India.
India has expressed concern at the “spiralling military violence in Balochistan”213 and has strongly condemned Nawab Bugti’s killing.214 Pakistan has not only denounced India’s comments as interference in its internal affairs but...
CONCLUSION VII. CONCLUSION (pp. Page 26-Page 27)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.10OPEN ACCESSAsked about a possible end to the stalemate in Balochistan, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti said: “At the moment war is being imposed on us. If someone survives it, then we’ll see. General Sahib [Pervez Musharraf] has promised to hit us in a way that we will not know what hit us. In one sense, it is quick death he is promising us. They could do this to a few Baloch leaders, but not to the whole Baloch nation”.224 In the wake of Bugti’s death, Musharraf still insists that his government will enforce the writ of the state at all costs.225...
APPENDIX A: MAP OF BALOCHISTAN APPENDIX A: MAP OF BALOCHISTAN (pp. Page 28-Page 28)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43686.11OPEN ACCESS