Front Matter Front Matter https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.1OPEN ACCESSTable of Contents Table of Contents https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.2OPEN ACCESSExecutive Summary Executive Summary (pp. i-iii)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.3OPEN ACCESSIntroduction I. Introduction (pp. 1-2)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.4OPEN ACCESSAfter being dormant for years, the M23 rebellion re-emerged in 2021 to mount an offensive that has gradually allowed it to capture swathes of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), including cities, roads and mines. Led mainly by ethnic Tutsi fighters, the movement has put forward demands focused on the protection of Tutsi civilians and combatants. An earlier iteration of the rebellion briefly took over Goma, capital of North Kivu province, in 2012, demanding that the government fulfil a promise to integrate demobilised insurgents into the national army. Key figures in that movement – including military chief Sultani Makenga,...
Who are the M23 Rebels? II. Who are the M23 Rebels? (pp. 3-14)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.5OPEN ACCESSThe Tutsi community has been at the centre of rebellions in the DRC since the 1990s. Congolese Tutsi live in territories in North Kivu and South Kivu near Rwanda and speak Kinyarwanda. The Congolese authorities have often tolerated hate speech against them and at times openly questioned or even revoked their Congolese nationality.⁴ The 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent influx of defeated soldiers and Hutu militiamen into Rwandophone areas of the Kivus worsened the plight of Congolese Tutsis, many of whom fled to Rwanda. Some of those who stayed in the DRC formed armed groups that, with Ugandan...
The M23 since the Fall of Goma: Rule and Expansion III. The M23 since the Fall of Goma: Rule and Expansion (pp. 15-22)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.6OPEN ACCESSThe M23’s territorial advances have come at a heavy cost for Congolese communities. Nearly four million displaced people live in make-shift shelters amid rapidly deteriorating health services in North and South Kivu, placing the eastern DRC among the regions worst affected by violence in the world.38 The majority have been forced to flee (often more than once) by fighting involving the M23, including half a million new displacements in 2025 alone. On top of that, the U.S. government decision to terminate development aid has hampered food and medicine deliveries, while reducing essential services in protection, resettlement assistance and food security.39...
The AFC/M23 on the National and International Stages IV. The AFC/M23 on the National and International Stages (pp. 23-30)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.7OPEN ACCESSThe AFC/M23 has used its military advances to obtain a seat at the negotiating table, hoping to portray itself as a legitimate Congolese political movement and extract concessions, starting with recognition of its authority over the areas it now controls. Diplomacy over the eastern DRC has as a result branched into multiple tracks, as Kinshasa negotiates with both Kigali and, reluctantly, the rebels. The rebellion, meanwhile, has become a disruptive catalyst in Congolese politics. Since the start of 2025, the opposition has increasingly accused the government of having lost its legitimacy as it is unable to defend the country, while...
Dealing with the New Reality in the Great Lakes V. Dealing with the New Reality in the Great Lakes (pp. 31-35)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.8OPEN ACCESSThe fall of Goma and the AFC/M23’s subsequent consolidation of its control of swathes of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces have redrawn the contours of power in the DRC. Diplomatic efforts by Doha and Washington have helped contain the short-term ambitions of the rebels and their Rwandan sponsors, at least for the duration of talks. Yet the ranks of the AFC/M23 continue to swell with new recruits, while AFC leader Nangaa has repeatedly made clear that the movement is intent on taking territory with the objective of overthrowing the government in Kinshasa. Furthermore, while Rwanda provided the impetus, weaponry...
Conclusion VI. Conclusion (pp. 36-36)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.9OPEN ACCESSThe renewed fighting in the eastern DRC since 2021 represents a huge setback after two decades of internationally supported peace-building efforts. The human impact of the latest wave of conflict has been calamitous: numerous families have been displaced multiple times, health and education systems are in tatters, and many lie dead. Equally alarming is how impervious these conditions seem to be to the efforts of diplomats, who have hurried to strike deals that have little or no effect on the fighting. The hard work, including getting a meaningful ceasefire in place, channelling help to the needy, laying out a plan...
APPENDICES Appendix A: M23 Control and Mining in the Eastern DRC Appendix A: M23 Control and Mining in the Eastern DRC (pp. 37-37)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.10OPEN ACCESSAppendix B: M23 Control and Mining in the Eastern DRC Appendix B: M23 Control and Mining in the Eastern DRC (pp. 38-38)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.11OPEN ACCESSAppendix C: About the International Crisis Group Appendix C: About the International Crisis Group (pp. 39-39)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.12OPEN ACCESSAppendix D: Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2022 Appendix D: Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2022 (pp. 40-41)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.13OPEN ACCESSAppendix E: International Crisis Group Board of Trustees Appendix E: International Crisis Group Board of Trustees (pp. 42-43)https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76799.14OPEN ACCESS